An expert is perfectly entitled to reach a strong opinion which supports the case of the party instructing them. The difficulty is when the reasoning appears to work the other way round, with the party’s case driving the expert opinion.

That distinction arose in KS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, where First-tier Tribunal Judge Froom considered expert evidence about conditions in Tajikistan. His criticisms ranged from whether the expert had demonstrated the necessary expertise through to the sources relied upon and the extent to which the appellant’s account had been independently examined. By the end of that analysis, the Judge’s view was that the expert was advocating for the appellant rather than providing critical and objective expert evidence.

The limits of an expert’s expertise

The expert described himself as a publicist, PR expert, television presenter and journalist specialising in Russia and post-Soviet states. He held degrees in international law and marketing and had written extensively for newspapers and websites.

The Tribunal was concerned about how much of that experience demonstrated expertise specifically in Tajikistan. Judge Froom noted that the expert did not appear to have visited the country, had held no academic post and listed only one publication, which concerned Russia. He concluded that sufficient expertise on Tajikistan had not been demonstrated.

This is an issue which can easily arise where someone has genuine expertise across a broad subject or geographical area. The question is not simply whether an expert is knowledgeable, but whether their knowledge and experience extend far enough to support the particular opinions they have been asked to give.

Checking the sources

Some of the most striking criticism concerned the source material.

The report stated that honour crimes were deeply ingrained in Tajik culture, particularly in rural areas, and cited four sources. Two dealt with domestic violence against women and the Tajik government’s response, another with religious freedom and the fourth was the Criminal Code of Tajikistan.

“I was not able to find any reference to honour crimes in any of these documents.”

Counsel was invited to identify such a reference and was also unable to do so. Judge Froom described the failure accurately to source the assertions about honour crimes as a “serious flaw in the report”.

The question of sources also arose in SU (Expert reports – format) Bangladesh [2026] UKUT 317 (IAC), which we considered in our article Online sources are not the expert opinion.

In SU, the Upper Tribunal emphasised that material relied upon should be identifiable and capable of being checked, and that experts should go back to the primary source wherever possible. The report must also distinguish between the underlying material and the expert’s own analysis and opinion.

KS illustrates the problem from a slightly different direction. Identifying a source is not enough if the source does not actually support the proposition for which it is being cited. The two decisions therefore fit rather neatly together. In SU, the emphasis was on making the source material transparent and traceable; in KS, the Tribunal was able to trace the sources and found that they did not support an important assertion in the report.

For experts who rely on academic papers, technical literature, industry publications, statistics or other external material, the practical discipline is much the same. The reader should be able to identify what has been relied upon, find it if necessary and understand what the expert says it establishes. A citation does not acquire authority merely by appearing in an expert report.

Assumptions and the client’s account

The Judge was also concerned about the way in which the expert dealt with information provided by the appellant.

Claims had been made about the influence of members of a particular family. The expert did not say that he had investigated those individuals or independently established the extent of their influence. Judge Froom said that the expert:

“simply accepts what the Appellant says and agrees with him”

and concluded that this did not assist the Tribunal.

Expert reports will often depend upon factual assumptions supplied by those instructing the expert. There is nothing unusual about that, and in many cases the expert will have no means of establishing those facts independently. What matters is being clear about the distinction between an assumed fact and something the expert has independently established, and not presenting the former as though it were the latter.

There is an interesting contrast elsewhere in the judgment. Judge Froom identified an issue concerning the alleged police search on which expert evidence might have assisted the Tribunal, but the report did not address it. The report therefore ventured into areas which concerned the Tribunal while leaving unanswered a question on which the expert might have been able to provide useful assistance.

When opinion becomes advocacy

Against that background, Judge Froom said:

“The distinct impression gained is that Mr Kharitonov is simply advocating on behalf of the Appellant”

rather than providing a critical and objective expert opinion. He went on to say that the expert “trespasses into the role reserved to the Tribunal”.

An expert does not preserve their independence by avoiding firm conclusions or carefully balancing every opinion. If the evidence leads strongly in one direction, the expert should say so. Independence lies in the process by which the opinion is reached: considering the relevant material, testing assumptions where appropriate, acknowledging the limits of the expert’s knowledge and allowing the evidence to determine the conclusion.

Seen together, the criticisms in KS explain why the Tribunal became concerned about advocacy. Questions about the expert’s specific expertise would not necessarily lead to that conclusion on their own. Nor would one poorly chosen citation. But where important assertions are unsupported by the sources cited, the client’s account is accepted without sufficient examination and opinions move into matters for the Tribunal, the cumulative effect can be rather different.

Judge Froom attached no weight to the report as expert evidence.

For anyone preparing an expert report, KS is a useful illustration of why independence has to be apparent throughout the report. It can be seen in the treatment of instructions and assumptions, in the selection and checking of sources, in recognition of the limits of the expert’s own expertise and, above all, in whether the reasoning genuinely leads to the opinion rather than being used to support a conclusion already reached.

Read the judgment: KS v Secretary of State for the Home Department on Find Case Law.